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THE NRL  PROTOCOL ANALYZER:  
AN OVERVIEW* 
CATHERINE MEADOWS 
~> The NRL Protocol Analyzer is a prototype special-purpose v rification tool, 
written in Prolog, that has been developed for the analysis of cryptographic 
protocols that are used to authenticate principals and services and dis- 
tribute keys in a network. In this paper we give an overview of how the 
Analyzer works and describe its achievements sofar. We also show how our 
use of the Prolog language benefited us in the design and implementation 
of the Analyzer. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A cryptographic protocol is a communication protocol that uses encryption in order 
to achieve goals such as distribution of cryptographic keys or authentication of prin- 
cipals and services, over a network that may contain a number of hostile intruders 
who may be actively trying to subvert he goals of the protocol. For example, if 
the protocol is intended for key distribution, the intruder may attempt o discover 
the session key, or more subtly, attempt o convince principals that some other 
word chosen by the intruder is itself the session key. If the protocol is intended 
for authentication of principals, the intruder may attempt o pass itself off as some 
other principal. 
Most cryptographic protocols are designed to function under very adverse con- 
ditions. In general, it is assumed that the intruder has complete control of all 
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communication channels, and thus can read all traffic, destroy or alter traffic, and 
generate traffic of its own. It is also usually assumed that some principals are 
cooperating with the intruder, and thus that the intruder will be able to perform 
operations uch as encryption that are available to honest users of the network. 
Given such requirements, it is not surprising that it is difficult to design cryp- 
tographic protocols that are free of flaws. Even quite simple protocols have been 
discovered to have flaws that inmany cases were not discovered until some time 
after they were published or even implemented. These flaws were independent of 
the strengths or weaknesses of the particular cryptoalgorithm used. 
As an example of the kinds of flaws that can occur, consider the following au- 
thentication protocol, originally proposed as part of an ISO standard, that makes 
use of a public-key cryptosystem [5], which is a cryptosystem in which the keys 
used for encryption and decryption are separate. This allows the encryption key to 
be distributed widely, and thus anyone can send a message to a party and be sure 
that it can only be read by its intended recipient by encrypting the message with 
that party's public key. The private keys can be used not only to decrypt messages, 
but to verify the origin of a message. A party can "sign" a message by decrypting 
it with its private key. A recipient verifies the signature by encrypting it with the 
public key and comparing it with the original message. If they match, the recipient 
knows that only the owner of the public key could have sent the message, since only 
he could have produced the signature. 
In the protocol we are about to examine, two parties A and B wish to be sure 
that they are communicating with each other. Each party P has a public key Kp 
and a private key Kpl(X). The application of public or private key operations 
to a message M is denoted by K(M), where K is a public or private key. A and 
B also possess the ability to generate nonces, which are unique random numbers 
that are to be used only once and then thrown away. The purpose of a nonce is 
to guarantee that a message is recent. A can guarantee that a message from B is 
recent by sending B a nonce. B then sends back the message, together with the 
nonce, signed with his private key. A can now be sure that the message was sent 
after he sent the nonce. 
In the protocol that follows, A and B are using the mechanisms described above 
to verify that they are communicating with each other. We use the common nota- 
tion A ~-~ B: M to stand for "A sends message M to B." 
1. A ~-~ B: A, Na, where Na is a nonce, that is, a number chosen by A that has 
never been used before. 
2. B ~ A: Nb, A, Kbl(Nb, Na, A), where Kbl(X) denotes the signing of X with 
B's private key and where Nb is a nonce chosen by B. A then verifies B's 
signature. A now believes that it has heard from B in response to A's original 
message, since the message is signed by B and contains A's nonce. 
3. A ~-~ B: N~,, B, K~-I(Na,,ND,B), where Na, is a new nonce generated by A. B 
checks the signature on A's message. B now believes that it has heard from A. 
In [6], the following attack is presented: Let I be the intruder. IM denotes the 
intruder impersonating M. 
1. IA ~-~ B: A, Nx, where Nx is a nonce generated by I. 
2. B ~-~ A: Nb, A, Kbl(Nb,Nx,A).  The intruder I intercepts this message and 
prevents it from reaching A. 
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IB ~-~ A: B, Nb. 
A ~-~ B: Na, B, K~-I(Na, Nb, B). B checks the signature and concludes that 
A has successfully initiated contact with it and that N× was a nonce orig- 
inating from A. A however, does not have a corresponding belief that it is 
communicating with B. 
As we see, in general it is not easy to see whether a cryptographic protocol is 
secure simply by looking at it. Even in a simple protocol such as the one just given, 
flaws can be very subtle. This has been shown also in a number of examples in the 
literature of protocols that were published, believed to be sound, and later shown to 
have security flaws [3, 4, 10, 11, 14]. Thus it is necessary to develop some rigorous 
means of reasoning about cryptographic protocols. 
In the last five years there has been a great deal of work done in developing formal 
models of cryptographic protocols. As in the analysis of conventional communica- 
tion protocols, there have been two kinds of techniques applied to this problem. 
One is to use logics of knowledge and belief to model the beliefs that evolve in 
the course of a protocol. The best known of these is the Burroughs, Abadi, and 
Needham logic [3]. Another is to model the protocol as an interaction between 
a set of state machines and to attempt o prove a protocol secure by specifying 
insecure states and attempting to prove them unreachable, by use either of exhaus- 
tive search backwards from the state, or by the use proof techniques for reasoning 
about state machine models. This is the approach taken by the NRL Protocol 
Analyzer. 
A number of challenges exist that must be met when applying this type of 
approach to cryptographic protocol analysis. One arises from the fact that the 
words used in a cryptographic protocol obey certain reduction rules; for example, 
encryption and decryption with the same key in a single-key cryptosystem cancel 
each other out. Another arises from the fact that, for all practical purposes, the 
search space is unbounded. For example, although the set of possible keys is finite, 
it is large enough so that a key cannot be found by exhaustive search. Thus, for 
the purpose of the model, we assume that it is infinite. Likewise, if we encrypt a 
word over and over with a key, we assume that we produce an unbounded set of 
words. Thus, if we attempt o use search alone, we will not succeed. Some other 
kinds of proof techniques are necessary. 
The NRL Protocol Analyzer was designed specifically to meet these challenges. 
It uses narrowing to handle the fact that words obey reduction rules, and it includes 
techniques and automatic support for using induction to prove that infinite sets of 
states are unreachable. Thus the NRL Protocol Analyzer can be used to prove 
security properties of cryptographic protocols as well as locate security flaws. The 
NRL Protocol Analyzer has been successful in doing both. In particular, it has 
been used to find previously unknown flaws in the Simmons selective broadcast 
protocol [14] and the Burns-Mitchell resource sharing protocol [2], and some hidden 
assumptions in the Neuman-Stubblebine reauthentication protocol [13] and the 
Aziz-Diffie wireless communication protocol [1]. The results of these analyses are 
contained in [10], [11], [16], and [21]. The NRL Protocol Analyzer has also been able 
to reproduce previously known attacks, including the one described in this paper. 
In particular, the Analyzer's uccess in reproducing known attacks is documented 
in [9], in which several different protocol analysis tools are applied to the same 
flawed protocol. 
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The Analyzer is also of interest as a Prolog application. It has been developed 
in Prolog from the beginning, and makes extensive use of many of the special 
properties of Prolog. In this paper, we will describe not only how the Analyzer 
operates, but how it makes use of the Prolog language. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and specification language used by the Analyzer. Section 3 describes how 
the Analyzer works and how the user interacts with the Analyzer. We also give 
some details about how the Analyzer is implemented in Prolog. In Section 4 we 
give a brief history of the Analyzer's development. In Section 5 we describe some 
of the advantages and disadvantages of using Prolog to solve this problem. 
2. THE MODEL AND SPECIF ICAT ION LANGUAGE USED BY  
THE ANALYZER 
2.1. Description of the Model and Specification Language 
The Analyzer is based upon a version of the term-rewriting model of Dolev and 
Yao [8]. In the Dolev-Yao model, it is assumed that there is an intruder who is able 
to read all message traffic, modify and destroy any message t~affic, and perform 
any operation (such as encryption or decryption) that is available to legitimate 
users of the protocol. However, it is assumed that there is some set of words (for 
example, encryption keys possessed by honest principals or messages that have 
been encrypted) that the intruder does not already know. His goal is to find out 
these words. Since any message received by an honest principal can be thought of 
as having been sent by the intruder, we can think of the protocol as an algebraic 
system being manipulated by the intruder. His goal is to manipulate it in such a 
way that a "secret" word is produced. 
The words produced by the algebraic system will obey a set of reduction rules. 
For example, encryption and decryption with the same key using a private-key 
algorithm is self-canceling. Thus, we can think of the intruder as attempting to 
solve a word problem in a term-rewriting system. Using this insight, Dolev and 
Yao, and later Dolev, Even, and Karp [7], developed a set of algorithms for proving 
the security of certain limited classes of protocols. 
Although our model is based on that of Dolev and Yao, the general approach 
we take to proving security properties of protocols is somewhat different. For one 
thing, we extend the goals of the intruder to include more than just finding out 
secret words. Many protocols (such as the example given in the Introduction to 
this paper) are broken, not by the intruder discovering a secret word, but by the 
intruder convincing a principal that a word has certain properties that it does not 
have. For example, a protocol can be broken if the intruder can convince a principal 
that a word already known by the intruder is a session key. Thus we extended our 
model to include local state variables possessed by the principals. 
The other difference was that we wanted to be able to examine a more general 
and open-ended class of protocols than those of Dolev and Yao. Thus, instead of 
developing a set of algorithms, we developed a general procedure for proving security 
properties of protocols by proving user-specified protocol states unreachable, and 
an interactive Prolog program that facilitates this procedure. 
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the NRL Protocol Analyzer, protocols are specified as a set of transitions of 
machines. Each transition rule is specified in terms of the following: 
Words that must be input by the intruder before a rule can fire. 
Values that must be held by local state variables before the rule can fire. 
Words output by the principal (and hence learned by the intruder) after the 
rule fires. 
New values taken on by local state variables after the rule fires. 
Event statements that describe the transition in terms of words used and 
principals involved. 
Transition rules can describe not only the actions of an honest user, but the 
actions of an intruder who produces new messages out of old by performing some 
operation such as encryption or decryption. 
Participants in a protocol communicate by exchanging words. We make the 
assumption that an intruder, upon seeing a word, is able to determine its history and 
significance, although he may not know the words that were used to construct he 
word he sees. Thus, if the intruder sees the word X = e(key(user(A)),message(A,N)) 
we assume that he is aware that X is a message from A generated by a key belonging 
to A, although he will not know key(user(A)) or message(A,N) unless he has seen 
them previously. Although in actual fact an intruder may not always have access 
to this sort of information, most of the protocols we have examined are designed to 
be secure under such strong assumptions about the level of knowledge available to 
the intruder. Thus we make these assumptions in order to have the best possible 
assurance of security. 
The assumptions about the knowledge of words available to the honest users are 
much more restrictive. An honest user will recognize the significance of a word if 
he has explicitly stored it as the value of a learned fact (see below). We may also 
specify a list of words that we assume the user is able to recognize, and what it is 
about them that he is able to recognize. For example, we may assume that a user is 
able to recognize all user names as user names, but may not be able to tell whether 
or not they belong to honest or dishonest users. Finally, an honest user is always 
able to recognize one attribute of a word: its length. Thus if a user is expecting a
two block long message, and receives one that is one block long, he has the ability 
to reject it. 
The words involved in these rules obey a set of reduction rules. A few of these are 
built-in rules supplied by the system, but most are described by the specification 
writer. We make the requirement that the set of reduction rules be congruent and 
terminating, in order that narrowing algorithms can be applied. 
Words are built by applying function symbols recursively to atoms or variables. 
Both function symbols and atoms must be specified by the specification writer. 
Some function symbols, such as the ones specifying encryption and decryption, 
stand for operations on words that can be performed by any principal who has the 
capability and who knows the arguments the symbol is being applied to. These 
function symbols are denoted operations in a protocol specification. If the intruder 
is assumed to be able to perform an operation, this must be indicated in its speci- 
fication. 
Each protocol participant possesses a counter that is incremented every time 
a protocol rule is fired that either changes its set of learned facts or causes it to 
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produce a word or words. The intruder also possesses a counter. This counter is in- 
cremented every time the intruder performs an action that involves communication 
with itself, such as occurs, for example, when the intruder performs encryption. 
If A is an honest participant in a protocol, we define the set of runs of the 
protocol ocal to A to be a set of sequences of state changes defined by the protocol 
designer. Each such state change defines a set of words produced by A and a set 
of changes to A's internal state variables. A run local to A is identified by the 
value of A's counter at the time the run begins. Any state variable that is changed 
during that run is identified by the run's identifier. Any possible application of 
a protocol rule must result in a state change that belongs to some run. For each 
possible local run, there is a protocol rule describing its beginning and a protocol 
rule describing its ending. We note that a participant may participate in two or 
more runs concurrently. 
Each honest protocol participant possesses a set of local state variables that we 
call learned facts, or lfacts. Each lfact is relevant o a given run of the protocol. 
An lfact is described using an lfact function, which has four arguments. The first 
identifies the participant A who knows the fact. The second identifies the run of the 
protocol. (If A is the intruder, then this argument will always be set equal to the 
value of the intruder's counter at that time.) The third indicates the nature of 
the fact, and the fourth gives the present value of A's counter. The value of the 
lfact is either a list of words that make up the content of the fact, or if the fact 
does not have any content, it is "[]", the empty list. Thus, for example, suppose 
that user(A) attempts to initiate a conversation with user(B) during local round N 
at time T. This can be expressed by the learned fact 
lfact(user(A), N, init_conv, T) = [user(B)] 
At any time S prior to T, the value of the lfact would be "[]". If user(B) receives 
a message X during local round S at time P which is apparently from user(A) 
attempting to initiate a conversation, this can be expressed by the learned fact 
lfact(user(B), S,rcvd_init_con, P) = [user(A), X] 
The value of a learned fact is calculated in the following way. First, if we have 
lfact(A, B, C, X) = Y, that is, the value of the lfact is Y when A's local counter is 
set to X. Suppose now that a rule fires that causes A to either generate a message 
or to change one of its lfacts, or both. Then A's local counter is set to s(X). If the 
rule causes lfact(A,B,C,X) to be set to Z, we have lfact(A,B,C,s(X)) = Z. If the 
rule causes no change to the lfact, then we have lfact(A, B, C, s(X)) = Y. All lfacts 
are initially empty, that is, set equal to the empty list []. 
Besides producing words and learned facts, each protocol rule also produces an 
event function. The event function gives a description of the event that occurred 
when that rule fired. Since these are used only to identify a transition, not to 
specify how it behaves, we do not go into any more detail about them here. 
Transition rules engaged in by the intruder, unlike those engaged in by honest 
participants, are not specified explicitly. Instead, they are constructed from specifi- 
cations of operations that the intruder is indicated as being able to perform. From 
each such specification a transition is constructed in which the arguments of the 
operation are inputed as words the intruder must know, and the output is the result 
of performing the operation. These transitions can be displayed by querying the 
Analyzer. 
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All transition rules are stored as Prolog facts whose arguments are words input, 
lfacts input, words output, and lfacts output, as well as some other relevant infor- 
mation about the rule, such as the corresponding event function. When a variable 
is used in the specification of a rule, it is stored as such in its Prolog representation. 
When a rule is applied, the variables in the rule are instantiated to the appropriate 
values. How this is done is described in more detail in Section 3. 
2.2. An Example Specification 
In this section, we give an example of how the ISO protocol we described above 
would be specified using the techniques described above. 
We begin our specification by listing the words and operations. The words 
involved are user names, random numbers, and private and public keys. The op- 
erations are the built-in list manipulation and id_check operations, and public and 
private key encryption. (We note that only private key encryption is used in the 
messages, but public key encryption is used to verify the signatures.) 
We begin with keys first. There are two types of keys, public keys and private 
keys, one each for each user. Thus we denote keys by pubkey(A) and privkey(A), 
where A is a user name. 
We now look at names. We note that there are two types of users, honest ones, 
and dishonest ones. The honest ones follow the rules of the protocol, while, accord- 
ing to our model, the dishonest ones are in league with the intruder, and thus are 
willing to share any information that they know with the intruder. Thus the tran- 
sition rules describing the protocol will describe only the behavior of honest users. 
The actions of dishonest users (e.g., sending messages or performing operations) 
are subsumed by the actions of the intruder; that is, if a dishonest user performs 
an actions, we can represent i by an intruder action. Moreover, any word (such as 
a key) known by a dishonest user is assumed to be known by the intruder. Because 
of this, we need to distinguish between honest and dishonest users. We do this 
by denoting them as user(A,dishonest) and user(A,honest), where A is a variable 
standing for some symbol distinguishing two honest users from each other or two 
dishonest users from each other. 
Finally, we look at random numbers. We want random numbers generated by 
different individuals at different imes to be unique, so we give each number the 
name of the originator and the time at which it was originated as argument. Thus 
each random number is designated as rand(user(A,X),N), where user(A,X) is a user 
name and N is an integer. 
We next look at operations. Instead of using two different symbols for public key 
encryption and decryption, we use the same symbol for encryption and decryption 
and distinguish between the two by specifying whether a public or private key is to 
be used. We assume that the intruder is able to perform public key encryption if 
he has access to the keys. 
We have the option of assigning lengths to words. Since we do not have any 
information on the lengths of the words used in the protocol, we do not take ad- 
vantage of it, except o assign length zero to words that do not stand for bit strings 
sent over the network. We now have four function symbol descriptions: one for 
user names, one for public keys, one for private keys, and one for random num- 
bers, and one operation description for public key encryption. We also have two 
atoms: "honest" and "dishonest." Note that we have not specified any atoms that 
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instantiate numbers or user ids, since we do not need to instantiate these in our 
analysis. 
Our specification of function symbols, operations, and atoms is as follows: 
op(1):pke(X,Y) --> Z: :length(Z) = length(Y):pen. 
fs(1):user(A,H) --> U::. 
fs(2):rand(user(A,H),N) --> R::. 
fs(3):privkey(user(A,H)) --> K::. 
fs(4):pubkey(user(A,H)) --> K::. 
atom(1) :honest --> H:0. 
atom(2) :dishonest --> H : 0. 
We next include two rewrite rules. They say that public key encryption first 
with a public key, and then with a corresponding private key and vice versa, is 
self-canceling. 
rrl: pke(privkey(X) ,pke(pubkey(X) ,Y)) => Y. 
rr2: pke(pubkey(X) ,pke(privkey(X),Y)) => Y. 
Next we include a list of the words known by the intruder. We assume that the 
intruder knows all user names and all public keys. We also assume that he knows 
everything known by a dishonest user, including all random numbers generated by 
dishonest users and all private keys belonging to dishonest users. We thus have: 
known:user(A,X), rand(user(A,dishonest) ,N), 
pr ivkey (user (A, dishonest) ), pubkey (user (A, X) ). 
We are now ready to write the specification of the protocol itself. For reasons 
of space, we limit ourselves to describing the behavior of the principal initiating 
the protocol. The specification of the behavior of the other party is similar. The 
initiator first sends off a message containing the name of who he wants to talk to 
and a nonce, and stores both values in a state variable called init_noncel. 
rule(1) 
If: 
count (user (A,honest)) = [N] , 
then: 
count (user(A,honest)) = Is (N) ] , 
intruderlearns ([user (A,honest) ,rand(user (A,honest) ,N)] ), 
Ifact (user (A,honest), N, init _noncel, s (N)) = 
[us er (B, W), rand (user (A, hone st), N) ] , 
EVENT: 
event (user (A,honest), N, ±nit _request, s (N)) = 
[user(B,W) ,rand(user (A,honest) ,N)] . 
The next two transitions describe the behavior of an initiator user(A,honest) 
upon receiving what purports to be a response to his initiation message. We need 
two transitions, one describing user(A,honest) receiving the message and checking 
it, and the other describing what user(A,honest) does i f  the check succeeds. The 
check is described by the use of the built_in id_check function on the result of apply- 
ing user(B,W)'s public key to the signature and on the result of concatenating Y, 
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user(A,honest)'s stored nonce Z and user(A,honest)'s name. Id_check(X,X) reduces 
to "ok" and so can be used to describe the check for identity: 
rule (2) 
If: 
count (user (A, honest) ) = [M] , 
intruderknows ( [Y, user (A ,honest), Z] ), 
if act (user (A, honest), N, init _nonce i, M) = [user (B, W), X], 
if act (user (A, honest) , N, init _gotnonce, M) = [] , 
then : 
count (user (A, honest) ) = [s (M) ] , 
ifact (user (A, honest), N, init _gotnonce, s (M)) = [user (B, W), Y, 
id _che ck (pke (pubkey (user (B, W) ), Z), (Y, X, user (A, honest) ) ) ] , 
EVENT: 
event (user (A, honest), N, init _testnonce, s (M)) = [user (B, W), X, Y, Z] . 
rule (3) 
If: 
count (user (A, honest) ) = [M] , 
if act (user (A, honest), N, init _gotnonce, M) = [user (B, W), Y, ok] , 
if act (user (A, honest), N, init _nonce i, M) = [user (B, W) , X] , 
If act (user (A, honest) , N, init _nonce2, M) = [] , 
then: 
count (user (A, honest) ) = [s (M) ] , 
intruderlearns ( [rand (user (A, honest), M), user (B, W), 
pke (privkey (user (A, honest) ), (rand (user (A, honest), M), Y, user (B, W) ) ) ] ), 
If act (user (A, honest), N, init _nonc e2, s (M)) = [rand (user (A, honest), M) ] , 
EVENT: 
event (user (A, honest), N, init _accnonce, s (M)) = 
[user (B, W), rand (user (A,honest) ,M) ,X,Y] . 
We note that it was necessary to have two transitions here instead of one, because 
if we collapsed them into one, we would have to have as one of the conditions that 
id_check on pke(pubkey(user(B,W)),Z) and (Y,X,user(A,honest)) succeed. This 
would require the use of operations appearing in a rewrite rule (namely "id_check" 
and "pke") appearing in the "if" part of a rule, which is not allowed. 
3. HOW THE PROTOCOL ANALYZER WORKS 
3.1. How the Analyzer Finds and Stores States 
The user of the Protocol Analyzer queries it by presenting it with a description of 
a state in terms of words known by the intruder and values of local state variables. 
All words used in that state specification are assumed already to be in their reduced 
form. The Analyzer takes each subset of the words and local state variables pecified 
by the user and, for each transition rule, uses a narrowing algorithm to find a 
complete set of substitutions (if any exist) that make the output of the rule reducible 
to that subset. In each case, when that is done, the input of the rule, together with 
any portions of the state that were not matched, is displayed as a description of a 
state that may immediately precede the specified state. Thus the Analyzer gives a 
complete description of all states that may precede the specified state. 
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The Protocol Analyzer does not display all the states that it finds. Instead, it 
uses a "generate and test" strategy. First, a complete description of all possible 
states that can precede the specified state are generated using the narrowing al- 
gorithm. Then various rules are used to discard states that have been shown to 
be unreachable, as well as paths that are redundant in the sense that that path 
is reachable only if some other existing path is reachable. Some of these rules are 
built into the Analyzer, while others are generated by the user as a result of proving 
results about the unreachability of classes of states. 
Built-in rules include rules for discarding states in which a word is used before it 
has been generated, rules for discarding paths that are interleaving of other paths, 
rules for discarding paths that require the intruder to look for the same word twice, 
and so forth. The user-generated rules are of more interest, and they are what gives 
the Analyzer much of its power. We describe these in the next section. 
Once a state has passed all the tests, it is stored in a database in the following 
way. Suppose that after querying a state S, we find that a state T precedes aS, 
where a is some substitution. Then we store this fact as the clause 
success([Numlist,W],[Numlistl,aS]), 
where Numlist and Numlistl give a Dewey decimal-style numbering of the states. 
Thus if Numlistl is N1.N2 . . . . .  Nk and T is the Mth state found preceding S, then 
Numlist is N1.N2 . . . . .  Nk.T. If state Q is later found to precede ~T for some T, we 
represent this by a clause of the form 
success([Numlist2,Q],[Numlist,~W]). 
If the user wishes to see a path from Q to S, this is done by unifying the second 
term of 
with the first term of 
success([Numlist2,Q],[Numlist,rT]) 
success([Numlist,T],[Numlistl,aS]) 
to obtain a path Q, rT ,  TaS. On the other hand, if the user wishes to see a path 
from T to S, the Analyzer will simply display T, aS. 
This approach to storing state descriptions has several advantages. For one 
thing, a user, by looking at different subpaths, can see the unifications being built 
up before his or her eyes. Second, it is easy to "undo" a line of inquiry just by 
deleting a set of tuples, since all information about previous unifications is still 
stored in the database. 
3.P. Database o/ Requirements on Reachable States 
In many cases the user of the Analyzer may be able to prove that some specified 
state is unreachable or that it is reachable only under the condition that the state 
variables take on certain values. For example, suppose that all session keys gener- 
ated by a key server are of the form seskey(server,N), and all nonces used to verify 
freshness of messages are designated by rand(A,M), where in both cases the first 
argument is the name of the originator, while the second argument is the time (by 
the originator's local clock) when it was generated. Suppose furthermore that we 
have a state variable W that designates a word that a principal has accepted as a 
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session key. Then we may be able to prove, for example, that W can never be of 
the form rand(A,M) (nonces can't be accepted as session keys), or that W can only 
be of the form seskey(server,N) (only session keys can be accepted as session keys), 
or that W can only be of the form rand(A,M) or seskey(server,N). 
The user can enter such facts into a database so that, whenever the Analyzer 
encounters a solution state that has been specified as unreachable, it discards it. If 
the Analyzer encounters a solution state containing a state variable that has been 
specified only to take on a certain value or values, it attempts to unify the value 
given in the solution with the value or values given in the database. If it cannot 
perform any of the unifications, then the solution state is discarded. Thus, if a 
solution state says that W is an accepted session key, and the database says that 
only words of the form seskey(server,N) can be accepted session keys, the Analyzer 
will attempt o unify W with seskey(server,N). If the unification can be made, the 
state variable will now take on that value. If the database gives two or more choices 
for conditions on a word, several different solutions will be created, each with the 
state variable set to the appropriate value. If none of the unifications can be made, 
the solution state will be discarded. 
It is possible to generate rules for the database automatically after having proved 
that a state is reachable only under certain conditions. One types the command 
"displaycons" while the search tree is still present in the Analyzer, and the appropri- 
ate rule is displayed. The rule is calculated in the following way. First each path to 
the goal that does not begin in an unreachable state is examined and the substitu- 
tions made to the variables in the goal that are produced by that path are collected. 
The entire collection is then examined for substitutions that are subsumed by others 
in the collection, and the subsumed substitutions are culled. Finally, the remaining 
substitutions are displayed in a form readable by the Analyzer. These can now be 
entered by the user into a file that can be input to the Analyzer. 
3.3. Database of Formal Languages 
One of the most powerful tools for limiting the search space in the Analyzer is the 
use of formal languages. Since the set of words generated in our model is infinite, 
one of the most common sources of infinite loops in the Protocol Analyzer is the 
case in which a search produces an unbounded set of words to be found. To give 
a simple example, suppose that we are trying to find out if the intruder can find 
a word of the form e(k,X), where k is a specific word, X is a variable standing for 
any word, and e(Y,Z) denotes encryption of Z with Y. Upon asking the system 
whether or not an intruder can find a word of the form e(k,X), we are told that this 
is possible only if the intruder can find a pair of words Y and e(Y,e(k,X)). Upon 
asking the system whether or not an intruder can find an irreducible word of the 
form e(Y,e(k,X)), we are told that this is possible if and only if he can find Z and 
e(Z,e(Y,e(k,X))), and so forth. At this point it should become apparent hat we 
are in danger of entering an infinite loop, and that it would be helpful to be able 
to prove that we are doing so. To this end, for each possible e(k,X), we define a 
language F as follows: 
F --~ e(k, A) 
F --* e(A, F) 
where A is the language consisting of all irreducible words. 
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We want to show that it is impossible to find any irreducible word of F unless 
some other irreducible words of F have already been found) We can then conclude 
that all irreducible words of F [including e(k,X)] are unobtainable. 
We do this as follows. We begin by creating a list of expressions so that each 
word of F is a case of some such expression. We may also put conditions on 
the expressions to the effect that certain words in the expression are members of 
some language. In this case, we have two such expressions with the corresponding 
conditions: 
1. e(k,X). 
2. e(A,B), where B is a member of F. 
We now check each expression by running the system on it to determine what 
words must be known. We already know that, in order to learn e(k,X), the intruder 
must know a word of F, so it remains to check the second expression. In that 
case, we simply ask the Analyzer how to find the word e(A,B). Suppose that the 
Analyzer tells us that the only case in which e(A,B) is found is one which requires 
prior knowledge of e(Z,e(A,B)) for some Z. Since e(A,B) is a word of F, so is 
e(Z,e(n,B)), and we are done. 
It is up to the user to specify languages, but membership in a language and 
the unreachability of a language are proved by the Analyzer. The user must obey 
certain restrictions in specifying languages. In particular, we make the restriction 
that the language be context-free, in the sense that every production in a language 
is of the form 
F ~ X, Conditions, 
where X is some expression and Conditions is a set of conditions on X, such as its 
length or the fact that it is not equal to some other word. This allows us to represent 
each production in the language as a Horn clause and to use Prolog to check for 
language membership in a natural way. The translation is done as follows. Each 
terminal symbol is assigned a constant name. Each nonterminal in X is replaced 
by a variable. If the nonterminal does not stand for the language of all words, then 
the condition langmember(V,Symbolname) is added to Conditions, where V is the 
variable substituting for the symbol and Symbolname is the name of the symbol. 
Likewise, a variable W is substituted for F and a name Fname is assigned to it. 
The clause 
i anguagerule (W, Fname, Condit ions ) 
is stored in the database. 
3.3.1. Procedure for Proving a Language Unreachable Our goal is to show that 
if the intruder knows a word A, and A is a member of a language L, and W is 
the set of words that the intruder knows before finding A, then W must contain 
a member of L. We do this by showing that whenever langmember(aA,L) can be 
shown for some substitution a, then langmember(X,L) holds for some X in aW. 
In order to make this possible, we introduce a procedure 
expandcondit ions(+*C,-D,+Type), 
1We restrict ourselves to irreducible words because all words learned by the intruder are ~-  
sumed to be in irreducible form. 
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where expandconditions(C,D,allsubs), given a condition C as input, finds a substi- 
tution a and a condition D implying aC, and expandconditions(C,D,always) finds 
D equal to the disjunction of all conditions implying C. This first is calculated by 
substituting for conditions of the form langmember(X,L) executions of proofs using 
unification, while the second is calculated by substituting executions of proofs using 
subsumption. This is done as follows: 
For each occurrence of langmember(X,L) in a condition C, where X is not a 
variable and L is not "all," expandconditions(C,D,allsubs) fir t finds a rule lan- 
guagerule(test,N,languagerule(A,L,V),C1) and a most general unifier a of X and 
A. It then replaces langmember(aX,L,aV) by aC1 in aC. It continues making 
these substitutions and replacements until no further such occurrences of langmem- 
ber(X,L,V) can be found. The result is D. Thus expandconditions(C,D,allsubs) 
provides a complete set of unifiers a and conditions D such that D1984 implies 
aC. 
Expandconditions(C,D,always) al o replaces all occurrences of the term lang- 
member(X,L,V), where X is not a variable and L is not "all," but instead of using 
unification, it uses subsumption. It looks for rules of the form 
languagerule(test,N,langmember(A,L,V),C1), 
where there exists a substitution A such that AA -- X, and replaces X in C by AC1. 
It continues in this way until no further such occurrences of langmember(X,L,V) 
can be found. It then produces the "disjunction" D of all conditions E produced 
in this way. 
Suppose now that we are attempting to prove that X implies Y. Computing 
all instances of expandconditions(X,Z,allsubs) will give a collection of pairs (aX,Z) 
which give a complete description of the conditions under which X is true. In other 
words, AX is true if and only if there is a (aX,Z) produced by expandconditions 
such that A = #a for some # and #Z is true. Our next job is to determine that, 
for each such pair, that Z implies aY. We thus need to compute the conditions 
under which aY is true. This is done using expandconditions(aY,U,always). Since 
U is the disjunction of a set of conditions under which aY is true, we have that U 
implies Y. We have thus reduced our problem to proving that Z implies U in each 
case. This can be often be done using Boolean algebra, since many of the same 
conditions will appear in aZ and U. Thus our last step is to use Boolean algebra 
to show that aZ implies U. 
As an example, consider the language defined by the following rules: 
languagerule (test, I, langmember (rand (A, N), f oo, V), ok). 
languagerule (test, 2, langmember (pke (pubkey (A), Y), foo, V), 
langmember (Y, foo, V) ). 
languagerule (test, 3, langmember (pke (privkey (A), Y), f oo, V), 
langmember (Y, foo, V) ). 
languagerule (test, 4, langmember ( (X, Y), f oo, V), langmember (Y, f oo, V) ). 
Suppose that we want to show that membership of pke(X,Y) in foo implies that 
(X,Y), the concatenation of X and Y, is in foo. We first invoke 
expandconditions(langmember (pk (X, Y), foo, V), Z, allsubs) 
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to obtain two solutions: 
1. X = pubkey(A), Z = langmember(Y, foo, V). 
2. X = privkey(A), Z = langmember(Y, foo, V). 
Invoking 
expandconditions(langmember((pubkey(A), Y), foo, V), U, always) 
on the first solution yields T = langmember(Y,foo,V); the same value of T is given 
for the second solution. Thus, in each case it remains to be shown that langmem- 
ber(Y,foo,V) implies langmember(Y,foo,V). This is trivially true. 
The observation that Boolean algebra can help us allows us to define the following 
procedure in Prolog (somewhat simplified from the way it is implemented in the 
Protocol Analyzer): 
impliesconditions (Langname, WI, W2) : - 
if then( expandconditions(langmember (WI ,L,V) ,Expcondl, allsubs), 
(( iookforconflicts(Expcondl) 
expandconditione (langmember (W2, L, V), Expcond2, always), 
implies (Expcondl, Expc ond2) 
)) 
). 
where the procedure ifthen(+A,+B) succeeds only if whenever A succeeds, then so 
does B. For each expression Expcondl and substitution a produced by expandcon- 
ditions, the procedure lookforconflicts(Expcondl) looks at Expcondl and attempts 
to determine if E is never true (for example, if E is "A = B," where A and B 
cannot be unified). If that is the case, Expcondl implies that aW2 is in L trivially. 
If lookforconflicts fails, the procedure 
expandc ondit ions (langmember (W2, L, V), Expcond2, always) 
is used to produce an expression Expcond2 implying that aW2 is in L. 
The procedure implies(+Expcondl,+Expcond2) is then used to prove that Ex- 
pcondl implies Expcond2. This is done by first putting each of Expcondl and 
Expcond2 in normal form (A1;.. .  ;An), where Ai = (B1, . . . ,  Bn) such that Bj is 
an atomic formula or of the form not(C) for some formula C, where C is also in 
normal form. We then attempt o show that if Expcondl = (X1;.. .  ;Xn) and 
Expcond2 = (Y1;. . .  ;Ym), then there exists a Yj that is implied by each Xi. Thus 
we are reduced to proving that (Z1, . . . ,  Zk) implies (Wl , . . .  ,Wt). This is done for 
the most part by showing that each condition Wi either appears in (Z1 . . . .  , Zk) or 
is always true. There are a few cases, however, where it was worthwhile to institute 
special procedures. For example, one condition that comes up often is not(A = B), 
which is translated as not(caseof(A,B,V)), that is, A is not subsumed by B. It is 
clear that not(caseof(A,B,V)) implies not(caseof(C,D,V)) if A is a subterm of C 
and B occurs in D the same place that A appears in C. This situation occurs often 
enough in our proofs that we have implemented it as a special case of the implies 
procedure. 
We now define another ecursive procedure, verifystates. The command 
verifystates(+L,+Conds,+S) 
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succeeds if every path to the state S contains at least one word that can be proved 
to be a member of L using Conds. It begins by finding each state T preceding S, 
and then uses impliesconditions to show that, there exists a word W known by the 
intruder in T such that Conds implies that W is a member of L. If that fails, it 
invokes verifystates(L,Conds,T). Verifystates fails if S is an initial state, that is, if 
S consists of words known by the intruder initially and lfacts that hold initially. 
We are now ready to prove that a language L is unreachable. We do this by 
invoking the procedure verifystates(L,langmember(W,L,V),[W]). In other words, 
we attempt o show that if W is a member of L, then in any state preceding a state 
in which W is known by the intruder, some other member of Langname is known 
by the intruder. If verifystates succeeds, we will know that we succeeded in proving 
this. 
We note that neither verifystates nor expandconditions is guaranteed to termi- 
nate. We guarantee termination by including limits on the number of times each 
procedure calls itself. These can be increased by the user. We also improve the 
efficiency of verifystates by having findstate look for how to reach a subset of a 
state instead of the entire state; except in the first invocation, where it queries a 
single word, it only queries the substate of a state consisting of state variables, and 
ignores words known by the intruder. This makes for a much smaller search space, 
although it may mean that verifystates may fail in cases in which language unreach- 
ability is actually provable. In practice, though, this has happened seldom enough 
and the improvement in efficiency has been great enough that we feel justified in 
implementing findstate in this way. 
3. 4 . How the User Interacts with the Analyzer 
The user interacts with the Analyzer by frst  entering the description of a state. The 
Analyzer then responds with a description of all states that that can immediately 
precede that state, minus the states that are eliminated by the checks described 
above. Once this is done, there are two options that can be followed, depending 
upon whether the Analyzer is being operated in manual or automatic mode. If the 
Analyzer is being operated in manual mode, the user queries each state produced 
individually. The user has the option of only querying part of each state, that is, 
asking how some subset of the words and state variables that make up the state de- 
scription is reachable, rather than the whole description. This option gives the user 
the ability to reduce the size of the search space without jeopardizing the sound- 
ness of the unreachability proof, since the unreachability of the substate implies 
the unreachability of the complete state, while the substate generally will have a 
smaller set of descriptions of preceding states than the complete set. However, if 
a subset is queried and is then shown to be reachable, it may be necessary to look 
at the entire state again to determine if it is reachable. The user has the option of 
"undoing" a portion of the search tree, as described in Section 3.1, and requerying 
it if this turns out to be the case. 
It is also possible to use the Analyzer in automatic mode. In this mode the 
Analyzer queries each state itself after the first one, instead of leaving the job to 
the user. The Analyzer uses some simple heuristics for querying substates when 
used in automatic mode (for example, it will not ask how to find a word that the 
intruder is assumed to know initially), but in general it queries the whole state 
or close to it. Thus, although it is possible to generate states much faster when 
128 C. MEADOWS 
the Analyzer is used in automatic mode, in general the amount of states generated 
will be larger. It is possible, however, to switch back and forth between automatic 
and manual mode. Thus, if the search tree is becoming too bushy, the user can 
switch back to manual mode, undo that part of the tree, query it manually, and 
then switch back to automatic mode. This may be done several times in a search. 
The Analyzer is generally used in two phases. In the first phase, the user builds 
up the state conditions database and the language database. In the second phase, 
the user specifies insecure states and attempts to prove them unreachable. It is 
possible, and usually necessary, to switch back and forth between the two stages. 
For example, the user may enter the second stage and then find that the state space 
generated is too large to be searched in a reasonable amount of time or that an 
infinite loop that suggests a formal language is being generated. In that case he or 
she may go back to the first stage and attempt o build up the state conditions and 
language databases further. 
An example of this search strategy in use is supplied in [9]. 
4. DEVELOPMENTAL H ISTORY OF  THE ANALYZER 
The Protocol Analyzer has been developed in several phases. Each phase supplied 
a greater amount of automated assistance to the user. When a phase was complete, 
it was used to verify a number of protocols, and procedures that were repetitive and 
susceptible to automation were identified. These procedures were then automated 
and included as Analyzer functions, and the Analyzer was tested further. 
To date, there have been three main phases. In the first, the Analyzer did little 
more than give a complete description of all states that could immediately precede a
given state. This version of the Analyzer was used to verify several simple protocols. 
While the Analyzer was in this state, several general procedures for proving classes 
of states unreachable were developed. These included the use of formal languages 
described in the previous ection. 
In the next phase, the user was given the option of directing the Analyzer to 
avoid states that had been proved unreachable. Thus, if the Analyzer came up with 
an answer in which the state immediately preceding the specified state was one that 
had previously been proved to be unreachable, that answer would be rejected. At 
this point, we used the Analyzer to examine a number of open literature protocols. 
Although the Analyzer was still somewhat cumbersome to use, we were able to find 
previously undiscovered flaws in two such protocols: the Simmons selective broad- 
cast protocol and the Burns-Mitchell resource sharing protocol discussed earlier in 
this paper. This convinced us that we were on the right track, and we proceeded 
to automate the Analyzer further. 
In the present version of the Analyzer, it is possible, not only to record the 
results of hand proofs, but in many cases to perform the proof automatically. For 
example, as we described earlier, the Analyzer can be used to prove inductively that 
the intruder cannot learn any word of a specified formal language. At this point we 
also introduced the automatic search feature. This makes the search much easier to 
conduct when the search space has become small enough to search exhaustively. We 
have continued to apply the Analyzer to open literature protocols, both those that 
were known and those that were not known to be flawed. The Neuman-Stubblebine 
and Aziz-Diffie protocols were analyzed when the Analyzer was in this state. 
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Our goal for the next phase is not only to have the Analyzer be able to prove 
lemmas automatically, but to also have it give some assistance in generating lemmas 
to be proved. Thus, it may be possible, for example, to have the Analyzer generate 
candidates for formal languages that can be proved unreachable. 
Finally, we note that the ability to prove unreachability of insecure states solves 
only half the problem. For cryptographic protocols, as in other areas, one must 
be able to determine what the desirable and undesirable properties are. To this 
end we have been developing a requirements language to be used with the Protocol 
Analyzer. In this language one specifies security requirements as requirements 
on sequences of events. The negation of the requirement can then be taken as an 
insecure state to be proven unreachable by the Protocol Analyzer. We have already 
applied this language to specify requirements for message authentication protocols 
[15], for key distribution protocols in which a session key is distributed by a trusted 
server [16], and for key agreement protocols, in which session keys are constructed 
out of secret information supplied by both parties [17], and we have found it to be 
useful both in providing goals for the Protocol Analyzer to verify and in bettering 
our understanding of the requirements of a protocol and the system it is to be 
used in. 
5. THE USE OF PROLOG IN THE ANALYZER 
The NRL Protocol Analyzer has been implemented in both Quintus Prolog and 
SWIProlog and at this point consists of about 4000 lines of code. We chose Prolog 
as the implementation language for two reasons. The first was that at the time 
this project started, very little was known about what techniques would be helpful 
in the analysis of cryptographic protocols and what would not. Thus, when we 
tried an approach, we had no way of knowing beforehand whether or not it would 
be useful. Thus we needed a language that would support rapid prototyping and 
would allow us to try a number of different approaches in a short amount of time. 
Another reason for our choice of Prolog was that the Protocol Analyzer is based 
on equational unification. Since Prolog is based on unification, this made it a 
natural choice for an analysis tool that uses narrowing as the basis of its state 
space search technique. This was especially helpful in languages like Quintus that 
offer unification with occur check. 
Prolog has served us well in these respects. In particular, although we were 
initially interested in unification mainly as a means to support he implementation 
of narrowing algorithms, we found out as we progressed in the development of the 
Analyzer that we often had need to make use of a subtle interplay between some 
subset of identity checking, subsumption, unification, and narrowing. For example, 
use of the database of requirements on reachable states requires first subsumption, 
to determine whether or not a state contains an element of the database, and then 
unification, to guarantee that that element can be made to satisfy the necessary 
requirements. The interplay is even more subtle in the verification of language 
unreachability. In order to prove a language unreachable, we first run the Analyzer 
on each production W of the language to determine what sets of words X must be 
known before that word could be produced, thus making use of narrowing. We then 
determine under what conditions W can be proved to be a member of the language, 
using unification, and, for each such unification and set of conditions, we determine 
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the conditions that guarantee that a member of X will belong to the language, 
using subsumption. Boolean algebra and checking for identity is then used to 
verify that the first set of conditions implies the second. Such delicate reasoning 
about the various variations on unification was not only relatively straightforward to
implement in Prol6g, but the Prolog paradigm, being based on unification, helped 
us to understand it more clearly. 
We also found Prolog very useful as a rapid prototyping tool. We were able to 
produce a number of different versions of the Protocol Analyzer very rapidly, each 
one including new techniques and functions that we could test on examples and 
decide whether or not to keep it. One case for which this was particularly helpful 
was in incorporation of procedures for verification of language unreachability. This 
is one of the more time-consuming operations in the Protocol Analyzer, and one 
of the ways we cut down on its expense is by reducing the sorts of situations in 
which the procedure will successfully verify a language to be unreachable. On the 
other hand, we do not want to reduce the scope of the cases handled so much that 
the procedure is not adequate to the types of situations that are likely to occur. 
The use of rapid prototyping made it easy to try out several different versions of 
the unreachability verification procedure and rate them according to speed and 
usefulness. 
Rapid prototyping also made it possible to defer automation of procedures until 
we had used the Analyzer enough to identify procedures that were used often enough 
and were repetitive nough so that automation was both possible and useful. This 
allowed us to maximize the benefit we got from increasing the automation of the 
Analyzer. For example, the language unreachability verification procedure was 
derived from examining the way in which such verification was done manually on 
output produced by the Analyzer. 
We also found a few drawbacks, although in many cases it was hard to determine 
whether these were to blame on Prolog itself or the way in which we used it. Most 
notable of these is the way in which the Protocol Analyzer relies on a "generate and 
test" strategy. A set of candidate states preceding a goal state is generated, and 
then a number of tests are run to eliminate unreachable states from the set. This 
had two advantages for us: one, since Prolog operates by producing all solutions to 
a query when it is questioned repeatedly, it is straightforward to implement such a 
generate and test strategy. It is also an easy strategy to adapt to rapid prototyping. 
Whenever we found a new way to prove that a class of states was unreachable, we 
simply implemented it as a new kind of test. However, the generate and test 
strategy can also be highly inefficient. In particular, toward the end of an analysis 
we usually find that the the Protocol Analyzer will be flunking considerably more 
candidate states than it passes, and thus as we progress in an analysis we find a 
marked reduction in the apparent rate at which the Protocol Analyzer produces 
new states. It is possible that a language that supported a more efficient search 
strategy would result in a more efficient implementation of the Protocol Analyzer. 
Other problems we had were more mundane. Although we found the degree to 
which Prolog supported the extensive interplay of subsumption, unification, and 
narrowing very useful in the implementation of the Analyzer, it made it harder to 
explain the Analyzer to those who were not familiar with Prolog and unification. 
We also found the lack of standardization of Prolog a problem when we tried to 
port the Analyzer from one version to another; this was in particular a problem 
when we used built-in functions. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we gave an overview of the NRL Protocol Analyzer, an interactive 
software tool for the analysis of cryptographic protocols. We showed how the An- 
alyzer works and how it is used, and we described its achievements so far. We 
also described the ways in which our choice of the Prolog language influenced the 
development of the Analyzer. Although the Analyzer is still under development, it 
has had a number of significant successes. As we continue to develop and refine it, 
we can hope for many more. 
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